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I. INTRODUCTION

Within the realm of taxation, the European Union seeks a balance
between the national sovereignty of its Member States and the goal of a
harmonized internal market.' The internal market is defined as "an area
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons,
services, and capital is ensured.",2 The original view was that any
differences between the tax systems of Member States had to be alleviated
in order to optimize productivity within the European Community because
Tax
disparate tax systems could be one of those internal frontiers.
harmonization would guarantee that companies would locate in specific
Member States because of efficiency of resources, not simply because of
advantageous tax systems.
In 1991, the Ruding Committee evaluated the need for greater
corporate tax harmonization by considering three questions posed by the
European Commission:
1)
2)

*

Whether differences in business taxation among Member
States create distortions with respect to investment
decisions and competition in the internal market;
Whether such distortions can be alleviated or eliminated
simply through the interplay of market forces and
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Tracy A. Kaye, Commentary Europe'sBalancing Act: Trends in Taxation, 62 TAX L. REV.
193, 193 (2008).
2.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 29, 2006,
art. 14, 2006 O.J. (C 321E) 37 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. All references to the "EC Treaty" refer to the
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.
3.

TAX COMPETITION INEUROPE 4 (Wolfgang SchOn, ed., 2003).
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competition between national tax regimes, or is action at the
Community level required; and
are required to remove
What specific Community measures
5
or mitigate these distortions?

The Ruding Report concluded that the tax differences did distort the
internal market and generated significant differences in the cost of capital.6
The Report contained many recommendations for legislative proposals that
were declared by the European Commission to be too ambitious.7
Such sensitivity exists because the power to levy direct taxes still rests
with the Member States under the terms of the Treaty establishing the
European Community (EC Treaty).8 Additionally, the taxation powers of
the Community are restricted by the principle of subsidiarity, which permits
Community action only if the objectives (such as the development of a
common market) cannot be met effectively by individual Member State
action. 9 Thus, the Community can legislate to eliminate tax obstacles to the
internal free flow of goods, persons, services and capital.' 0
However, European Community tax legislation has been rare as tax
"Unlike VAT, direct taxation is at a
matters require a unanimous vote.
5. Commission of the European Communities, Report of the Committee of Independent
Experts on Company Taxation, 11 (Mar. 1992) [hereinafter Ruding Report]. In December 1990,
Commissioner Scrivener established this committee chaired by former Dutch Finance Minister Onno
Commission of the European Communities,
Ruding, to recommend corporate tax proposals.
Commission Communication to Parliamentand to the Council-Guidelineson Company Taxation, 148
SEC (90) (601) final.
6.

Ruding Report, supra note 5, at 11.

7.
See Commission of the European Communities, Commission Communication to the
Council and to the European Parliament Subsequent to the Conclusions of the Ruding Committee
Indicating Guidelines on Company Taxation Linked to the FurtherDevelopment of the Internal Market,
SEC (92) (1118) final (June 24, 1992). See also Tracy A. Kaye, European Tax Harmonization & the
Implicationsfor U.S. Tax Policy, 19 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 109, 147 (1996).
8.
Jan Wouters, The Case-Law of the European Court ofJustice on Direct Taxes: Variations
upon a Theme, 1 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 179, 180 (1994). See also LAURENCE W. GORMLEY,
EU TAXATION LAW 2 (2005) (noting that the power retained by the Member States in the area of direct
taxation must be exercised in a manner consistent with the terms of the EC Treaty).
9.
Tracy A. Kaye, Tax Discrimination: A ComparativeAnalysis of US.and EU Approaches,
7 FLA. TAX REV. 47, 51 (2005). See also George Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism
in the European Community and the UnitedStates, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 332, 339 (1994).
10.
SERVAAS VAN THIEL, FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND INCOME TAX LAW:
EUROPEAN COURT IN SEARCH OF PRINCIPLES 13 (2002).

11.

THE

Id. at 112. Article 94 provides a legal basis for direct taxation harmonization measures:
The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and
after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social
Committee, issue directives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or
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purely embryonic stage of harmonization.,'0 2 The scope of Community
direct tax legislation is currently limited to a few corporate tax directives,
an interest and royalty directive, a savings directive, and a mutual assistance
directive.13 There is an additional mutual assistance directive that enables
tax authorities to assist each other in the collection of tax claims. 14 In 1990,
the Member States also concluded the Arbitration Convention to provide
for binding arbitration of transfer pricing disputes when the respective tax
authorities have been unable to resolve the issues within two years.' 5
The Savings Taxation Directive enables tax administrations to
automatically exchange information on an individual's interest income.
This Directive is receiving some current attention as the Commission has6
proposed amendments to close loopholes and to ameliorate tax evasion.'
In June 2009, the European Union Finance Ministers announced
administrative provisions of the Members States as directly affect the
establishment or functioning of the common market.
EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 94. Cf Albert J. RAdler, Tax Provisions of the Treaty ofRome-Lost in
Transition, in MEMORIAM KARl S. TIKKA 1944-2006 422, 425 (Edward Andersson ed., 2007)
(discussing the possibility of changing a distortionary tax measure through an Article 96 directive
approved by a qualified majority of the Council if consultation by the Commission with the Member
State is unproductive).
12.

Case C-279/93, Finanzamt K6ln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. 1-225, Op.

19.

Council Directive, 90/435, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 6 (Parent-Subsidiary Directive), as amended
13.
by Council Directive 2003/123, 2004 O.J. (L 7) 41; Council Directive, 90/434, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 1
(Mergers Directive), as amended by Council Directive, 2005/19, 2005 O.J. (L 58) 19; Council Directive,
2003/49, 2003 OJ. (L 157) 49 (Interest and Royalty Directive); Council Directive, 2003/48, 2003 O.J.
(L 157) 38 (Savings Taxation Directive); and Council Directive, 77/799/EEC 1977 O.J. (L 336) 15
(Mutual Assistance Directive), as amended by Council Directive, 2004/56, 2004 O.J. (L 127). The
European Commission has proposed a replacement Mutual Assistance Directive that would set up
procedures, scope, and conditions for the exchange of information on request, the automatic exchange of
information, spontaneous exchange of information, and administrative notification among Member
States and between Member States and third countries. Commission of the European Communities,
Proposalfor a Council Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Taxation, Brussels,
Belgium (Feb. 2,2009).
Council Directive, 2008/55, 2008 O.J. (L150) 28 (Recovery of Tax Claims Directive).
14.
The Commission has also proposed a new directive to replace the existing Recovery of Tax Claims
Directive, Proposalfor a Council Directive concerning mutual assistancefor the recovery of clams
relating to taxes, duties andother measures, Brussels, Belgium (Feb. 2, 2009).
15.
Convention 90/436 on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the
Adjustments of Transfers of Profits Between Associated Undertakings, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 19.
16.
Commission of the European Communities, Proposalfora Council Directive amending
Directive 2003/48 on taxation of savings income in the form of interestpayments, Brussels, Belgium
(Feb. 2, 2009). See also Meeting with the ECON Committee, Speech of Commissioner LAszl6 Kovics
at
available
2009),
6,
(Oct.
Brussels
3,
http://ec.europa.eu/commission-barroso/kovacs/speeches/2009/ECONCommittee6oct.pdf (last visited
Mar. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Kovics Speech].
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Member States for
recommendations agreed to by all twenty-seven
17
Directive.
Taxation
Savings
the
strengthening
IL COMMON CONSOLIDATED CORPORATE TAX BASE PROJECT

The twenty-seven Member States of the European Union currently use
twenty-seven different methods of calculating the corporate tax base,
resulting in unnecessary compliance costs and administrative burdens for
European businesses. 18 In May of 2005, Liszl6 Kovics, Commissioner for
Taxation and Customs Union, requested that the European Economic and
Social Committee (EESC) issue an opinion on the creation of a "common
consolidated corporate tax base" (CCCTB) in the Union.19 The EESC
endorsed the CCCTB plan in February of 2006.20
The goal is to improve the efficiency of the internal market and create
a business-friendly tax environment by minimizing compliance costs with
respect to cross-border activity.2' The CCCTB creates a single tax base for
all European group economic activity in an effort to eliminate tax
differences among Member States.22 The European Community hopes that
the change to one single set of rules will result in reduced costs and burdens
23
as well as cross-border loss set-off opportunities.
For example, a United Kingdom multi-national corporation with
subsidiaries in France and Germany would not distinguish among its
individual companies, but would calculate group profits collectively. The
Member States where these corporations are active would divide this
consolidated profit based on an allocation formula. Each Member State
would then have the ability to tax its portion of the joint consolidated profit

Charles Gnaedinger, ECOFINAgrees on Approach to Improve Savings Tax Directive, 54
17.
TAX NOTES INT'L 921, 927 (June 15, 2009).
18.

Kovdcs Speech, supranote 16, at 6.

19.
LAszl6 Kovics, Speech of Commissioner Kovics at the Plenary session of the Economic
May 2005), available at
Committee on EU Taxation Policy (12
and Social
(last
http://ec.europa.eu/commissionbarroso/kovacs/speeches/eutax_policy_plenarysession.pdf
visited Mar. 1, 2010).
20. See generally Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Creation
of a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in the EU, 2006/C 88/12.
LAszl6 Kovics, European Commissioner for Taxation and Customs, Keynote Address in
21.
at
2006),
available
(Sept.
28,
of
Parliament
UK
Houses
the
http://ec.europa.eu/commissionbarroso/kovacs/speeches/SpeechLondon_280906.pdf (last visited Mar.
1, 2010) [hereinafter Kovdcs Keynote Address].
22.
Foreign Lawyers Forum, held by ABA Section of Taxation 2008 Midyear Meeting CDROM, (Jan. 18, 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Foreign Lawyers Forum].
23.

Kovtcs Keynote Address, supra note 21, at 6-7.
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at its own tax rate.24 Thus, rather than companies limiting themselves to
national operations in order to minimize costs of compliance with various
Member States' tax laws, the CCCTB would facilitate cross-border
25
operations and simplify corporate taxation of European Union companies.
Although not all Member States agree with the implementation of the
CCCTB project, all twenty-seven participate in the working group
responsible for evaluating the practical aspects of a common corporate tax
base.26 One of the major fears of the Irish people before they ratified the
Lisbon Treaty was approval of a common tax base and the possible
consequences to tax rates in Ireland.27 However, Commissioner Kovdcs
stressed in an October 2009 speech before the ECON Committee that the
proposed CCCTB "has no implication on tax rates which would remain in
the competence of the Member States. 28 Now that Ireland has ratified the
Lisbon Treaty, the debate on the CCCTB has been revived.2 9
Nevertheless, tax commentators have predicted that progress on the
CCCTB project is unlikely before the second half of 2010, as the outgoing
Commission will be disinclined to make controversial decisions that could
affect the re-election of Commissioners.3 ° Other tax observers say that the
CCCTB project has been delayed because it is too complex. 3' The goal of
the European Commission had been to present a "comprehensive
Community legislative measure" by the end of 2008,32 followed by a

24.

Paulus Merks, Europe: The World's Most Competitive Economy by 2010, 55 TAX NOTES

INT'L 729, 731 (Aug. 31, 2009).
25.

European Commission, Directorate-General,Taxation and Customs Union, Progress to

Date and Future Plans for the CCCTB, Brussels, Belgium, I

76-77 (Nov. 20, 2006) [hereinafter

Progress to Date].
26.
Corporate

European Commission, Summary Record of the Meeting of the Common Consolidated
Tax

Base

Working

Group

(Aug.

31,

2006),

available

at

http://ec.europa.eu/taxation-customs/resources/documents/taxation/company-tax/common-tax-base/CC
CTBWP037summaryen.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2010).
27.

Charles Gnaedinger, EU Tax Sovereignty Pledge Could Spur Approval of Lisbon Treaty,

54 TAX NOTES INT'L 1083, 1084 (June 29, 2009).
28.

Kovics Speech, supra note 16, at 7.

29.

Charles Gnaedinger, Irish Voters Approve Lisbon Treaty, 56 TAX NOTES INT'L 96, 97

(Oct. 12, 2009).
30.

Bob van der Made, European Union: Outlook for the CCCTB, INT'L TAX REv. (July/Aug.

31.

Common Tax Base Plans on Hold Under New EU Presidency, INT'L TAX REV. (Feb.

2009).
2009).
32.
Progress to Date, supra note 25, 74. The Commission prepared a working paper that sets
out a possible outline of the principles of a CCCTB to bring the various structural elements of the base
together into a coherent set of rules. European Commission, CCCTB: possible elements of a technical
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The project has been delayed, but by no means

111. EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE JURISPRUDENCE 34
The European Court of Justice case law has illustrated how the
tax treatment of losses in cross-border situations, exit taxation,
taxes on transfer of assets, withholding taxes on cross-border
income, anti-abuse rules as well as inheritance taxes can all
constitute tax obstacles
to the internal market. And these are just
35
a few examples.

So much of the coordination progress in the area of national direct tax
laws has resulted from European Court of Justice (ECJ) judgments
regarding discrimination.3 6
Article 12 of the EC Treaty explicitly states that "any discrimination
on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited., 37 Generally speaking,
Member States are not permitted to enact national legislation that
distinguishes between domestic and foreign persons, goods, services or
capital.38 These restrictions are part of the four fundamental freedoms
espoused by the EC Treaty. 39 According to the jurisprudence of the ECJ,
outline (July 26, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxationcustoms/resources/documents
taxation/companytax/common-tax-base/CCCTBWP057_en.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2010).
33.
Foreign Lawyers Forum, supra note 22. Commissioner-Designate Semeta (for Taxation
and Customs Union) stated in his confirmation hearing that he intends to finalize the CCCTB as soon as
possible. Press Release, European Commission, Summary of hearing of Algirdas Semeta - taxation and
customs union, audit and anti-fraud (Jan. 11, 2010) (on file with author).
34.
This section relies heavily on Tracy A. Kaye, Commentary Europe's Balancing Act:
Trends in Taxation, 62 TAX L. REV. 193, 195 (2008).
35.
Lszl6 Kovics, European Commissioner for Taxation and Customs, Internal Market
without direct tax obstacles: the Commission's proposals to help cross border activities in the European
Union (Nov. 23, 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/commissionbarroso/kovacs/speeches/
dhik_20061123.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2010).
36.
Servaas van Thiel, The Direct Case Law of the European Court of Justice: Past Trends
andFuture Developments, 62 TAX L. REV. 145, 168-69 (2008).
37.
EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 12. See generally Tracy A. Kaye, Tax Discrimination: A
Comparative Analysis of U.S. and EU Approaches, in REUVEN AVi-YoNAH ET AL, COMPARATIVE
FISCAL FEDERALISM 191 (2007).
38.
A number of provisions within the EC Treaty prohibit measures that discriminate or
otherwise restrict these fundamental freedoms as between nations. Wolfgang Sch6n, State Aid in the
Area of Taxation, in LEIGH HANCHER ET AL., EC STATE AIDS 241, 244 (3d ed. 2006).
39. The fundamental freedoms are the freedom of movement of goods, persons, services, and
capital. EC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 23-27 (prohibiting intra-EC customs duties), 39 (free movement
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the four freedoms are directly applicable. 40 This means that individuals
may challenge the validity of a national law, including a tax law.4 1 Where
Member States have failed to bring their tax legislation into conformity
with European Union law, the ECJ has done it for them by striking down
any national tax laws that violate these fundamental freedoms.42
For example, one of the first tax competition cases heard by the ECJ
dealt with the free movement of goods.43 In a case popularly known as the
Newspaper Publishers case, the ECJ struck down a French tax law that
permitted deductions for publishers that produced newspapers related to
politics, as long as the publisher was actually printing in France. 44 The ECJ
concluded that the tax law obstructed intra-community trade because it
denied benefits to newspaper publishers established in other Member
States. 45 Thus, the Court struck down the law for violating the principle of
the free movement of goods.
The well-known Avoir Fiscal case exemplifies the ECJ's protection of
the free movement of establishment.46
The Commission instituted
proceedings against France because French tax law granted imputation
credits to resident shareholders for distributed company profits, but denied
the same credit to non-resident shareholders.4 7 The end result under the
French law was that French subsidiaries of a German-based insurance
company received no tax credit because they were not incorporated in
France. The ECJ ruled that this was discrimination on the basis of
nationality and violated the free movement of (corporate) persons.48 Thus,
corporations formed in a European Union Member State with subsidiaries
in other Member States receive the same protections as a European Union
national would and cannot be discriminated against.4 9

of workers), 43, 48 (freedom of establishment), 49 (free movement of services), and 56, 58 (free
movement of capital).
40.
Case C-26/62, NV Algemene Transport - en Expedite Ondememing van Gend & Loos v.
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1,
12-13.
41.

SERVAAS VAN THIEL, EU CASE LAW ON INCOME TAx PART 15 (2001).

42.

Taxing Judgments, EU Taxes andthe EU Court, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 2004, at 67.

43.

EC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 28, 29.

44.

Case C-18/84, Comm'n v. France, 1985 E.C.R. 1-1339.

45.

Id.

46.

EC Treaty, supranote 2, art. 43.

47.

Case C-270/83, Comm'n v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 273.

48.

Id.

49.
Tracy A. Kaye, The Gentle Art of CorporateSeduction: Tax Incentives in the UnitedStates
and the European Union, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 93, 99 (2008) [hereinafter Kaye, CorporateSeduction].
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Additionally, Member States may not place restrictions on the freedom
to provide services, meaning that there can be no discriminatory taxes on
service providers or on foreign investors.50 For example, Member States
may not tax foreign lottery winnings differently than domestic lotteries.
The ECJ struck down a Finnish law that taxed lottery winnings from
lotteries organized outside Finland but granted an exemption for lottery
winnings obtained through Finland-based lotteries. 5 ' The ECJ concluded
that a lottery was a service and declared this disparate tax treatment as
discriminatory.52 Thus, the law was struck down as violating the free
movement of services.
Finally, Member States may not place restrictions on the movement of
capital.53 Although there is a limited exception available for discriminatory
tax policies in place prior to 1994, Member States are prohibited from
placing discriminatory taxes on foreign capital.54 For example, Member
States cannot assess a stamp tax against loans taken out by citizens from
foreign lenders if that same tax is not generally levied against loans taken
from domestic lenders.55 In Sandoz, the ECJ struck down an Austrian
stamp tax even though the legislation itself did not expressly apply only to
foreign lenders.56 Rather, the legislation applied only to loans formalized in
writing. However, because most loans in Austria were not memorialized in
writing, the legislation had a de facto discriminatory impact against foreign
lenders.57
58
IV. THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR BUSINESS TAXATION

Finally, this essay briefly comments on another development that has
affected direct taxation, the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation (Code
of Conduct). Due to the difficulty of reaching unanimous agreement on
European tax legislation, the use of non-legislative approaches, "soft law,"
50.

EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 49.

51.

Case C-42/02, Lindman v. Skatterattelsnamnden, 2003 E.C.R. 1-13519.

52.

Id. 27.

53.

EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 56.

54.

Kaye, CorporateSeduction, supra note 49, at 99-100.

55.

Case C-439/97, Sandoz GmbH v. Finanzlandesdirektion fur Wien, 1999 E.C.R. 7041.

56.

Id.131.

57. Id.
27. It is important to note that the ECJ's concern did not center on the
discouragement of the lending of capital generally but focused on the disparate impact between foreign
and domestic loan companies. In dicta, the Court commented that if the stamp tax impacted both
foreign and domestic lenders equally, it might be permissible.
58. This section borrows freely from Tracy A. Kaye, Commentary Europe 's Balancing Act:
Trends in Taxation, 62 TAX L. REv.193, 196-99 (2008).
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has become accepted in the European Union.59 The European Union's
Code of Conduct for Business Taxation is the first example of "soft law" in
the area of corporate taxation. 60 The Code of Conduct was established by
the Economy and Finance Council based on a recommendation from the
European Commission with regard to the elimination of harmful tax
competition. 61 Although the Code of Conduct is not binding on the
Member States, those adopting it agree to reduce any existing tax measures
that constitute harmful competition and to refrain from instituting any
similar measures in the future.6 2 Although not a legally binding document,
the Code of Conduct carries great political force.63
This effort was successful in that the Code of Conduct provided a
system to tackle the issue of harmful tax competition and the criteria in the
Code of Conduct made evaluation of specific tax regimes possible. The
method of peer review performed by the Primarolo Group was an
innovation for tax policy. 64 Over 271 business tax measures were evaluated
and sixty-six were removed or amended once they were determined to be
harmful. 65 There is evidence of actual effects on Member States' tax
policies.66 Commentators have pointed out that "it would be politically

59.
Commission of the European Communities, Communicationfrom the Commission to the
Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee: Tax Policy in the
European Union-Prioritiesfor the Years Ahead, at 22-23, COM (2001) 260 final (May 23, 2001). See
Rfidler, supra note 11, at 423. See also Commission of the European Communities, Communication
from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social
Committee: Co-ordinatingMember States'DirectTax Systems in the Internal Market, COM (2006) 823
final (Dec. 19, 2006).
60. Claudio Radaelli, The Code of Conduct against Harmful Tax Competition: Open Method
of Coordinationin Disguise?, 81 PUB. ADMIN. 513, 521 (2003).
61. Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 1997 Concerning Taxation
Policy, 1998 O.J. (C 2) 1, 1, 4-5.
62. See generally European Union, Harmful Tax Competition: The Code of Conduct,
(last
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation-customs/taxation/company-tax/harmfultax-practices/index-en.htm
visited Nov. 13, 2009) (describing the nature and purposes of the Code of Conduct).
For example, Ireland repealed its preferential 10% tax rate for certain manufacturing
63.
activity and replaced the targeted incentive with an overall corporate tax rate of 12.5% in 2003. Michael
Mikiciuk, Foreign Direct Investment Success in Ireland: Can Poland Duplicate Ireland's Economic
Success Based on Foreign Direct Investment Policies?, 14 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 65, 106
(2006).
64.

Radaelli, supra note 60, at 526.

65.

Id. at 523-24.

"[R]ecent changes in The Netherlands' intermediate royalty and interest companies,
66.
advance pricing agreements and advance ruling practices have been linked to the intention of the Dutch
government to comply with the criteria listed by the code." Id. at 527.
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difficult now to propose the same type of beggar-thy-neighbour
regimes
67
which were so popular up until the mid-1990s.,,
The European Union Finance Ministers reinforced their commitment
to this process by adopting guidelines on good governance in tax matters. 68
Approximately 200-250 billion Euro per year is lost due to tax fraud,
evasion, and avoidance in the European Union; thus, the Commission is
making efforts to "promote transparency, exchange of information and fair
tax competition, in other words good governance in tax matters." 69 The
goal is to improve governance in tax matters within the European Union,
with hope that such governance will set up a moral and political base from
which Member States can demand good governance related to tax from
partner countries outside of the European Union.7 °

67.

Id.

68. Commission of the European Communities, Communicationfrom the Commission to the
Council, the EuropeanParliamentandthe EuropeanEconomic and Social Committee, PromotingGood
Governance in Tax Matters, COM (2009) 201 final, Brussels, Belgium (Apr. 28,2009).
69.

Kovics Speech, supra note 16, at 2.

70.

Id.

